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JUDGES AS POLITICIANS:
THE ENDURING TENSION OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Richard Lorren Jolly*
Elections transform the basis of judicial legitimacy. Whereas a
permanently appointed judiciary finds support in its supposed neutrality,
the democratic judiciary demands responsiveness. Yet while this is obvious
to scholars, the electorate, and most judges—and is in fact confirmed by
much statistical data—the Supreme Court and others continue to insist that
judicial campaigns can be sculpted to ensure robust democratic debate
without compromising the bench’s impartiality. This Essay rejects the
notion that the court can be both democratic and disinterested. It reviews
the volatile history of judicial elections as well as the modern web of
distinctions between protected and proscribable campaign speech. It
concludes that elections are incompatible with judicial impartiality, that
the elected judiciary of the twenty-first century is a third political branch
charged with delivering democratic goods, and that it delivers regularly.
INTRODUCTION
It’s an election year. Politicians all over America are meeting
constituents, making promises, and raising money—and so are judges.
This last point might surprise those hailing from abroad. “To the rest of
world,” as one judge quipped, “the American adherence to judicial
1
elections is as incomprehensible as our rejection of the metric system.”
Indeed, only two other nations use elections for selecting or retaining

© 2016 Richard Lorren Jolly. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Research Fellow for the Civil Jury Project, New York University School of Law.
Thanks go to Justice Bridget McCormack, the students of the Michigan Law Supreme Court
Elections seminar, and Maja Martin. Of course, all errors are my own.
1 Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1995, 1996 (1988).
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2

judges, compared to thirty-nine American states. This means that ninety
percent of all state judges in the United States face democratic scrutiny at
3
some point.
This is not a new development: judicial elections date back to the
early nineteenth century. But while past judicial elections were rather tame
affairs, the twenty-first century has seen these contests grow increasingly
4
politicized. For instance, in the 2012 Michigan Supreme Court campaign,
Republican opponents of Democrat-backed candidate Bridget McCormack
critiqued her pro bono experience by airing attack ads claiming that
5
McCormack had “volunteered to help free a terrorist.” Elections have
grown increasingly expensive, too. In 2000, 2002, and 2004, all judicial
candidates combined raised $123 million in campaign funds, which was
6
nearly double the amount spent in the three previous cycles. And from
2003 to 2004, state supreme court candidates alone raised a combined
7
$46.8 million.
Consequently, judicial elections—which were once
colorfully described as being just as exciting as “playing a game of
checkers by mail”—have become fully politicized sports not unlike those
8
seen for traditional public office.
These intense judicial contests largely resulted from court decisions
holding restrictions on judicial candidates’ campaign speech
unconstitutional. The watershed case is Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, in which the Supreme Court ruled that Minnesota’s Announce
Clause—which forbade candidates for judicial office from declaring their
views on disputed legal and political issues—violated the First

2 Switzerland elects some lay judges of canton courts, and Japan’s Supreme Court
judges face infrequent retention elections. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of
Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349,
1351 n.3 (2010) (citing Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 691 n.3 (1995)).
3 Matthew J. Streb, The Study of Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE
RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 1, 7 (Matthew J.
Streb ed., 2007) [hereinafter RUNNING FOR JUDGE].
4 Janet Stidman Eveleth, Restoring Civility to Judicial Elections, 41 MD. B.J. 48, 48
(2008).
5 See Andrew Rosenthal, Opinion, Everyone Deserves Legal Representation, N.Y.
TIMES:
TAKING
NOTE
(Nov.
1,
2012,
3:35
PM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/everyone-deserves-legal representation/?.
6 See Streb, supra note 3, at 1 (citing DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004: HOW SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE ON OUR COURTS HAS
REACHED A ‘TIPPING POINT’—AND HOW TO KEEP OUR COURTS FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 13
(2005),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_10569.pdf).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 2.
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Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia acknowledged the
tension in Minnesota’s attempt to secure an open-minded yet elected
10
judiciary, but reasoned that “the First Amendment does not permit it to
achieve its goal by leaving the principle of elections in place while
11
preventing candidates from discussing what the elections are about.”
Over the next decade and a half, courts addressing campaign restrictions
have struggled to reconcile the tension between ensuring a robust
democratic election and recognizing the compelling state interest in
securing an actual and perceived unbiased judiciary.
This Essay rejects the notion that the bench can be at once both
democratic and impartial. The tension between these two concepts is
irreconcilable because informed elections make judges responsible for
delivering democratic goods and transform the judiciary into a political
branch. The argument proceeds in three parts. First, Part I reviews the
history of judicial elections, emphasizing their uneasy beginnings and
cataloguing the various electoral systems practiced today. Next, Part II
assesses the twenty-first-century court’s struggle to balance the tension
between democracy and judicial legitimacy, analyzing the illogical web
delineating protected and unprotected judicial-campaign speech. Finally,
Part III evaluates the current state of judicial elections, drawing upon
scholarship, judicial experiences, and recent statistical data to show that the
tension persists and cannot be resolved.
I.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

States did not always elect their judges. To the contrary, all thirteen
original states appointed judges in some fashion. Eight vested appointment
in one or both of the houses, two utilized gubernatorial appointments with
legislative confirmation, and three utilized gubernatorial appointment with
12
the consent of an executive council. In most ways, this system mirrored
the federal approach of executive appointment with the advice and consent
of the Senate, which itself migrated from the English tradition of king13
selected judges.
During the eighteenth century, then, the American
judiciary was insulated from direct democratic scrutiny.
This consensus on judicial appointments slackened with the rise of
Jacksonian democracy. Around the early and mid-nineteenth century,

536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
Id. at 779.
Id. at 788.
Rachel Paine Caufield, The Curious Logic of Judicial Elections, 64 ARK. L. REV.
249, 252 (2011) (citing LARRY C. BERKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES:
A
SPECIAL
REPORT
(2010),
http://judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Berkson_1196091951709.pdf).
13 See id.
9
10
11
12
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citizens began emphasizing political accountability and direct participation
14
in government decisionmaking.
The unelected and unaccountable
judiciary proved an obvious target.
Compared to their appointed
counterparts, voters considered elected judges more independent from
political elites and therefore worthy of greater public trust and
15
confidence.
Georgia was the first state to employ elections, passing a
16
constitutional amendment to elect lower court judges in 1812.
17
Mississippi moved to elect the entirety of their judiciary in 1832. And
most noteworthy, every state entering the Union after 1845 opted for
18
judicial elections over appointments.
The enthusiasm for democratic judiciaries was short-lived, however.
Mid-century industrialization brought with it political machines that came
to dominate all facets of the political process—including judicial
19
elections.
The electorate began to view the elected bench as corrupt,
20
unethical, and unqualified.
For example, in considering a proposal to
elect judges in Massachusetts, one delegate argued that other states’
judiciaries had already “fallen hopelessly into the great cistern” and had
21
made judges part of the “political mill.” And after only two decades of
holding judicial elections, the New York legislature openly considered a
22
return to appointments. By 1906, Roscoe Pound, then Dean of Harvard
Law School, warned:

14 See Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practices
for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 167 (2007) (first citing
ALLAN ASHMAN ET AL., THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS
9–10 (1974); then citing CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE
RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 4 (1997); and then citing Larry C. Berkson,
Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, in JUDICIAL POLITICS: READINGS
FROM JUDICATURE 50, 50 (Elliot E. Slotnick ed., 2005)).
15 See Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic
Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850–1920, 1984 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 345.
16 EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 108 (Lawbook Exchange,
Ltd. 2005) (1944).
17 Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 854 (2002)
(citing MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE L. LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE CROSSREVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 90 (1988)).
18 Id. (citing VOLCANSEK & LAFON, supra note 17, at 90).
19 Caufield, supra note 14, at 168.
20 Id.
21 Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, 64
JUDICATURE 176, 176–77 (1980) (quoting Russell D. Niles, The Popular Election of Judges
in Historical Perspective, THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK 528 (1966)).
22 Id. at 177.
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[W]e must not be deceived by . . . inevitable discontent with all law into
overlooking or underrating the real and serious dissatisfaction with
courts and lack of respect for the law which exists in the United States
to-day . . . .
....
. . . Putting courts into politics and compelling judges to become
politicians in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional
23
respect for the bench.

Despite Pound’s warnings, states continued throughout the twentieth
century to compel potential judges to campaign for their seat.
A middle way emerged during the twentieth century in the form of
merit selection, also known as the “Missouri Plan.”
Like many
progressive-era reforms, merit selection began as an academic attempt to
24
remove power from the electorate and vest it with experts instead. The
approach combined non-partisan nominating commissions with periodic
retention elections, under the belief that appointive systems were better
able to identify strong judges while elections guaranteed their
25
accountability. The American Bar Association endorsed merit selection
in 1937, and soon after Missouri became the first state to adopt the
26
system—hence the namesake Missouri Plan.
Today, the Missouri Plan—with its commissions of experts—is the
most common approach to selecting judges. It is utilized in twenty-four
27
states as well as the District of Columbia. A small number of other states
employ similar appointment schemes. In California, Maine, and New
Jersey, judges are chosen through gubernatorial appointment with the
28
advice and consent of the legislature.
And in Virginia and South
29
Carolina, legislatures rather than governors appoint judges. All of these
23 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, Address Before the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association (Aug. 29,
1906), in 14 AM. LAW. 445, 445, 450 (1996).
24 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675, 677
(2009).
25 Caufield, supra note 14, at 169–70.
26 Id. at 170.
27 These states include: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. See id. at 171, 180 (citing AM.
JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL
JURISDICTION
COURTS
(2004),
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial_Selection_Charts_1196376173
077.pdf).
28 See Judicial Selection in the States, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2016).
29 Id.
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appointment-based systems employ periodic retention elections. While
retention elections in most states are uncontested—meaning that only the
incumbent judge is listed on the ballot—a judge’s performance is no less
susceptible to electoral scrutiny in these jurisdictions.
Other states use elections both to choose and retain judges. Interstate
distinctions are plentiful, with perhaps the most important being whether or
30
not the election is partisan.
A partisan election is one in which the
judicial candidate is designated on the ballot as belonging to a particular
political party, not unlike a candidate for the legislature or executive. A
non-partisan election is one in which the judicial candidate is presented on
the ballot without party identification, not unlike a candidate for a
municipal position. Partisan elections are only slightly less common than
non-partisan elections; eight states employ the former while thirteen
31
employ the latter.
And some states, for example Michigan, formally
utilize a non-partisan system, though the two major political parties vet,
32
nominate, and even indirectly fund candidates.
II.

JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

As shown above, states have generally enjoyed broad authority to
structure their judicial elections. The twenty-first century, however, has
seen the Supreme Court and others severely constrain that freedom.
Informed by developing conceptions of political speech, the Court started
its perilous endeavor of trying to ensure robust judicial elections while
simultaneously recognizing the states’ interest in encouraging an unbiased
and impartial judiciary. Over the last decade and a half, the Court’s project
has resulted in a web of distinctions between protected campaign speech
and that which states may proscribe. Though these distinctions may be
reasoned, the results are absurd.
33
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White sparked this development.
In that case, five Justices of the Supreme Court invalidated part of
Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting judicial candidates from
34
“announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found that the Announce Clause did
not pass constitutional muster because the speech restriction was not
35
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. In reaching this

30 For an in-depth discussion on the difference between partisan and non-partisan
elections, see generally Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, Party Identification and
Vote Choice in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections, 37 POL. BEHAV. 44 (2015).
31 See Judicial Selection in the States, supra note 28.
32 Id.
33 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
34 Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)).
35 Id. at 776.
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conclusion, the Court rejected the argument that a candidate announcing
her views posed a special threat to her actual or perceived open36
mindedness. Avoiding preconceptions on legal issues is impossible, the
Court reasoned, and pretending that a judge lacks such preconceptions
would be foolish and undesirable. And regardless, a meaningful distinction
exists between a judge announcing her views and her promising a particular
37
ruling. According to the Court, the judge who has merely announced a
view—rather than promised a specific outcome—will not feel wed to a
particular ruling once elected.
The majority also worried that the restriction prevented the electorate
from forming and casting knowledgeable votes. Though the Minnesota
Supreme Court had construed the Announce Clause to allow general
discussions of caselaw and judicial philosophy—allowing, for instance, a
candidate to assert that she is a “strict constructionist”—Justice Scalia
38
criticized this as insufficient to ensure an informed electorate. The Court
specified that judicial philosophies carry “little meaningful content for the
electorate unless [they are] exemplified by application to a particular issue
39
of construction likely to come before a court.” So while states can decide
whether or not to hold judicial elections, “[that] greater power . . . does not
include the lesser power to conduct elections under conditions of state40
imposed voter ignorance.”
Candidates must be allowed to inform the
voters on the issues.
The majority’s opinion provoked impassioned dissents. Justice
Stevens stressed the uniqueness of the judiciary, noting that “[e]lected
judges, no less than appointed judges, occupy an office of trust that is
41
fundamentally different from that occupied by policymaking officials.”
He acknowledged the foolishness of pretending that judges lack
preconceptions, but explained: “The lawyer who writes an article
advocating harsher penalties for polluters surely does not commit to that
position to the same degree as the candidate who says ‘vote for me because
42
I believe all polluters deserve harsher penalties.’” Indeed, to an electorate
forming views on the court’s impartiality, the difference between an
announcement and a promise is a distinction without a difference. As
Justice Ginsburg contended in her dissent, when candidates publicize their
positions the public reasonably expects a “quid pro quo—a judicial

See id. at 778–80.
Id. at 780–81.
Id. at 773 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, White, 536 U.S. 765).
Id.
Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
41 Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 801.
36
37
38
39
40
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candidate’s promises on issues in return for the electorate’s votes at the
43
polls.” Query: What other way could they possibly view it?
Though White only addressed Minnesota’s Announce Clause, its
consequences rippled. Spurred by the new pronouncement, judicial
hopefuls successfully mounted challenges to campaign restrictions across
the country. Challengers appealed rules prohibiting judicial candidates
from overt political acts including: making promises or commitments,
personal solicitation of funds, endorsing other politicians, announcing
44
political party affiliations, and making false or misleading statements.
And some states, in a deliberate effort to avoid litigation, amended their
rules to make them less restrictive and thereby make the elections more
political. For instance, North Carolina welcomed the newly politicized
judiciary by altering its rule from, “A judge should refrain from political
activity inappropriate to his judicial office,” to the polar opposite, “A judge
may engage in political activity consistent with his status as a public
45
official.” White did not predetermine these changes, but the difficulty of
balancing the central tension of judicial elections was clearly evident.
One particular area exemplifying this difficulty is courts’ treatment of
partisan-affiliation clauses—that is, rules prohibiting a judicial candidate
from announcing whether she is, say, a Republican or a Democrat. The
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, but the Sixth, Seventh, and
46
Eighth Circuits have all overturned party-affiliation restrictions.
The
Sixth Circuit’s decisions are worth scrutinizing. In Carey v. Wolnitzek,
Judge Sutton likened Kentucky’s party-affiliation clause with the
Announce Clause at issue in White. Party affiliations, he explained, are a
type of “shorthand” that allow candidates to “announc[e]” their views on
47
many issues at once. Preventing such shorthand announcements violates
the candidate’s right to speak and the electorates’ right to be meaningfully
informed.
Six years later, the Sixth Circuit reviewed an almost identical rule in
48
Winter v. Wolnitzek, on appeal from the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Because Kentucky’s judicial elections are non-partisan, the new rule
prohibited candidates from “suggesting to the voters that the candidate is

Id. at 818 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See J.J. GASS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., AFTER WHITE: DEFENDING AND AMENDING
CANONS
OF
JUDICIAL
ETHICS
2–3
(2004),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/ji4.pdf.
45 Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
46 See Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189 (6th Cir. 2010); Siefert v. Alexander, 608
F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005)
(en banc).
47 Carey, 614 F.3d at 202.
48 Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2016).
43
44
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the endorsed judicial nominee of a political party.” A candidate could not
claim, for instance, “I am the conservative Republican,” because it
insinuated that the candidate was supported by the Republican Party.
Judge Sutton, writing again, held that the regulation was impermissibly
vague because it provided a candidate little guidance for when she could
exercise her right to affiliate with a political party, versus when she implied
50
an impermissible connection. The article “the” proved a constitutionally
51
insufficient differentiator.
Though both Carey and Winter are well-reasoned, the results are
absurd. While it is true that party-affiliation can be used as a shorthand
announcement for a variety of positions, it also communicates a great deal
more to the electorate. Party-announcements paint candidates in partisan
colors, transforming them into the judicial counterpart of the Red and Blue
legislative and executive candidates.
Moreover, the advantage of
informing the electorate of this association is doubtful.
From a
jurisprudential viewpoint, it is unclear what it means to be a “Republican
judge” or a “Democrat judge.” Political machines do not enlighten judicial
voters; they merely politicize the contest. Kentucky surely understood this
when it chose to employ non-partisan elections. And while Kentucky
remains free to hold non-partisan elections post Carey and Winter, it may
not prevent a candidate from informing the electorate of her partyaffiliation or bending her words to suggest that she is party-endorsed.
Now, Kentucky may only withhold party-affiliation from the ballot—
information that voters likely already came to know through the
candidate’s campaign.
Despite these dramatic developments, the Supreme Court has only
addressed judicial elections twice since White. In 2009, the Court dealt
with campaign contributions and judicial recusal in Caperton v. A.T.
52
Massey Coal Co. There, a justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court
refused to recuse himself in a case involving a coal company that donated
53
three million dollars to his campaign. The justice cast the deciding vote
in favor of the donor, and the loser appealed arguing that it was denied due
process. The Supreme Court agreed, explaining that recusal is required
when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or
54
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”
The Court
explained that while “[n]ot every campaign contribution by a litigant or
attorney creates a probability of bias that requires a judge’s recusal,”
because of the amount of money donated here—which constituted more
49
50
51
52
53
54

Winter v. Wolnitzek, 482 S.W.3d 768, 776 (Ky. 2016).
Winter, 834 F.3d at 689.
Id.
556 U.S. 868 (2009).
Id. at 873–74.
Id. at 872 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
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than all other donors combined—the “probability of bias” was simply “too
55
high.” Of course, as Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent acknowledged, this
56
rationale invites more questions than answers. Most importantly: How
big of a contribution does it take to compromise judicial integrity? The
majority didn’t even attempt an answer.
The last word from the Supreme Court came in 2015. In WilliamsYulee v. Florida Bar, the Court upheld a Florida restriction on judicial
57
candidates personally soliciting campaign funds. The Court took pains to
emphasize the uniqueness of the judiciary, stating not once but twice:
58
“Judges are not politicians.” Because of the judiciary’s traditional role as
an impartial moderator, Florida could lawfully restrict candidates from
personally soliciting campaign funds in order to preserve “public
59
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.” But are appearances all that
matter? The Florida rule still allowed candidates to indirectly raise funds
through campaign committees and even permitted candidates to personally
write thank-you notes to donors. Perhaps the Court is correct that there is a
perceptible difference between candidates asking for money and directing
donors to a committee, but the bench’s actual impartiality remains fully
compromised. Judges may not be able to request funds, but they know who
is footing the bill.
As shown, the Court’s balancing project has delivered peculiar results:
judges may announce their beliefs, so long as they do not promise a
specific vote; judges may declare their party-affiliations and imply
endorsements, even in non-partisan elections; judges may consider
democratic input, but not if a specific voter gave too much money; and
judges may direct potential donors to their campaign committees, but not
personally solicit funds. These bizarre results—say the courts—tame the
tension between meaningful elections and an actual and perceived impartial
judiciary.
III.

THE IRRECONCILABLE TENSION

Courts’ attempts to balance judicial campaigns between ensuring
informed elections and an impartial judiciary are admirable, but futile.
Once judges are free to announce their views, affirm political affiliations,
and indirectly raise money, the bench ceases to be impartial. Because the
elected judiciary’s legitimacy can no longer be found in providing unbiased
rulings, courts must instead stake their legitimacy in securing democratic
Id. at 884.
Id. at 893–98 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (posing forty questions left unanswered by
the majority’s opinion).
57 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).
58 Id. at 1662, 1672.
59 Id. at 1666.
55
56
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goods. Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s refrain, elected judges are
politicians. To be sure, all of the data suggests that judges are understood
by voters and among themselves as politicians, and that they act
accordingly.
There are many ways to achieve judicial legitimacy. Federal judges,
for instance, are largely considered legitimate because of their electoral
unaccountability. These judges are appointed by the executive, confirmed
60
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and hold their office “during
61
good Behaviour” —which is almost without exception life tenure. Since
there can be no formal retribution resulting from the ordinary course of
their decisionmaking, federal judges do not face democratic scrutiny. This
is beneficial because, as Alexander Hamilton explained, an appointed and
unaccountable bench protects against the “encroachments and oppressions
of the representative body,” and is “the best expedient which can be
devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
62
administration of the laws.”
Put simply, unelected judges can make
unpopular rulings in order to protect individuals or minorities without fear
of retribution. It is their role in ensuring adherence to the Constitution that
makes them legitimate.
But an appointed judiciary is not without shortcoming. There is a
conceptual difficulty with a democracy consisting of a coequal government
63
branch that is neither elected nor accountable.
Constitutional scholar
64
Erwin Chemerinsky described this “counter-majoritarian difficulty” as “a
paradigm that emphasizes the democratic roots of the American polity and
65
that characterizes judicial review as at odds with American democracy.”
An unaccountable body wielding the power to review democratically
enacted laws—even striking them down as it alone sees fit—is
incompatible with representative government and is therefore unjustifiable,
66
critics claim. This is no new argument: Thomas Jefferson recognized that
making judges “dependent on none but themselves” ran counter to the
67
principle of “a government founded on the public will.” Put another way,
unaccountable judges may choose to act as untouchable super-legislators,

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id. art. III, § 1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986).
64 Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV.
43, 71 (1989) (quoting BICKEL, supra note 63, at 16).
65 Id. at 61.
66 Id. at 70–71.
67 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 12 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 5 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
60
61
62
63
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impeding democratic developments and leaving the public with few
options.
Judicial elections solve the counter-majoritarian difficulty, yet in so
68
doing pose their own inverse problem—a “majoritarian difficulty.”
Professor Steven Croley describes this: instead of worrying “how
unelected/unaccountable judges can be justified in a regime committed to
democracy,” the majoritarian difficulty asks “how elected/accountable
69
judges can be justified in a regime committed to constitutionalism.” The
concern is that when judges must answer to the public, they are less likely
to impartially apply the law and more likely to respond to political
70
pressures. Critically, elected judges may be less likely to rule in favor of
unpopular parties, especially if they have reason to believe that doing so
will affect their chances at reelection. Reciprocally, they will be more
likely to rule for favorable voters and campaign contributors. With judicial
elections, rule of law takes a backseat to political expediency.
There is no easy solution to the majoritarian difficulty. Elections
strike at the heart of the judiciary’s purpose, at least as conventionally
understood. Historically, judges are unique among state actors because
their legitimacy is founded not in providing democratic outcomes, but
71
rather in providing undemocratic impartiality. Many have noted that the
judiciary—more so than any other government branch—is able to develop
public good will, legitimize government policies, and generate voluntary
72
conformance with laws. The public’s delicate willingness to extend this
deference is based at least in part on the perception that judges are removed
from the ordinary sway of politics—their application of the law governed
not by partisan ideology, but rather by logic or even some sense of
73
wisdom. In fact, studies repeatedly show the most significant factor in
the public’s evaluation of the judiciary is the perceived fairness of court
74
processes.
That is to say, Americans traditionally care less about
75
outcomes than they do about fairness.

Croley, supra note 2, at 694.
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See id.
See id.
See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 17–18 (1964);
Croley, supra note 2, at 691; James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Intuitional
Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 470
(1989).
73 See Gibson, supra note 72, at 469.
74 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE
COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 43 (1999); DAVID B. ROTTMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
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But elected judges are incapable of maintaining perceptions of judicial
fairness. Elections not only expose those men and women behind the
bench, they explicitly require the public to choose which individuals will
apply and evolve the law. This democratic exercise betrays the concept of
the law as impersonal, independent, and objective. In the layman’s mind,
how can there be a judicial election if the law exists in serene neutrality?
Of course, critics will fault this characterization. They will argue that the
perception of law being applied by nondescript, objective, and wise men
and women is pure fantasy—and they would be absolutely correct. The
law is not self-executing and there are many flaws with the “judge-as76
umpire” analogy made famous by Chief Justice John Roberts. Calling
“balls and strikes” necessarily involves subjectivity, and judges—whether
appointed or elected—bring their preconceptions to the bench.
To succumb to this critique, however, is to misunderstand both the
judiciary and the analogy’s depth. The umpire’s decisions are legitimate
not because he is objective in marking the strike zone, but because he
benefits from the systemic integrity of the game. The coaches may spit,
bump chests, and kick dirt as much as they please; none of it changes the
umpire’s position as the disinterested arbiter. Yet imagine that it came to
be known that one of the teams had selected this particular umpire from
among many, surrounded him with influential and moneyed individuals,
and showered him with power and prestige. They further told him that if
he did not rule in their team’s favor that he would fast find himself out of
the park. In this hypothetical, all of the umpire’s calls would be rightly
compromised, regardless of how “objectively” he called the game. Each of
his calls would be scrutinized for real or imagined bias. This is precisely
the predicament of the elected judiciary: from the public’s seat, elected
judges mean a rigged game.
Yet even a rigged game can be played. And this is precisely what has
happened with the advent of hyper-politicized judicial elections following
White. New free-for-all contests have entangled jurists in voters’ minds
with the executive and legislative branches, as well as with the political
parties. Judges have come to be seen not as neutral and independent
arbiters, but as Red and Blue politicians for the third political branch. This
result is unsurprising. If a judge is to be held democratically accountable,
she cannot assert legitimacy as an independent arbiter. She is necessarily
seen as in the pocket of those who put her on the bench. The only
alternative, then, is to abandon conceptions of judicial impartiality and,
instead, provide democratic goods. That is to say, elected judges must call
“balls and strikes” as the people who put them there would want. The
majoritarian difficulty so commands.
76 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
55–56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
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This need not be an apocalyptic prospect. If, as the data suggests,
Americans are more interested in having a neutral and independent
77
judiciary than one that is ruled by partisan ideology, then that public is apt
to support and fund those judicial candidates whom they believe will rule
most fair-mindedly. Justice Kennedy makes precisely this point in his
Williams-Yulee dissent. “If the State is concerned about unethical
campaign practices,” he suggests, “it need not revert to the assumption that
78
voters themselves are insensitive to ethics.”
Ensuring free and open
elections “might stimulate discourse over the requisite and highest ethical
standards for the judiciary, including whether the people should elect a
79
judge who personally solicits campaign funds.” Citizens are free to elect
judges who will adhere to traditional notions of judicial neutrality, or
instead choose those who actively deliver political goods. Democracy is
the solution to, not the problem with, judicial elections.
Still, the general public, and even the judges themselves, see things
differently. According to a 2007 poll conducted by the Annenberg Public
Policy Center, “69% [of the public] thinks that raising money for elections
80
affects a judge’s rulings to a moderate or great extent.” These sixty-nine
percent appear to be onto something. According to another poll, over sixty
percent of judges indicated that fear of losing an election affects their
81
judicial behavior.
Judges express that they experience this fear even
when losing an election is highly unlikely, for instance in unopposed
82
retention elections. Former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus
explained this phenomenon: “There’s no way a judge is going to be able to
ignore the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if he or
she has to make them near election time. That would be like ignoring a
83
crocodile in your bathtub.”
Statistics bear out this crocodile. For instance, the Brennan Center for
Justice at New York University School of Law found that judges hand out
significantly longer sentences in serious, violent criminal cases the closer
84
the sentencing judge is to running for re-election.
And the more
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frequently television ads air during an election, the less likely elected state
85
supreme court justices are to rule in favor of criminal defendants.
Imposition of capital punishment is particularly affected by judicial
elections: over the past fifteen years, appointed judges reversed death
sentences twenty-six percent of the time, while judges facing retention
elections reversed fifteen percent of the time and judges facing competitive
86
elections reversed only eleven percent of the time. Elected judges, either
implicitly or explicitly, regularly rule against those who are politically
disfavored.
Judges also consistently rule in favor of their campaign donors. In a
large empirical study, Stephen Ware identified a “remarkably close
correlation between a justice’s votes on arbitration cases and his or her
87
source of campaign funds.” And a New York Times study found that Ohio
Supreme Court justices voted in favor of their contributors more than
seventy percent of the time, with one justice voting for his contributors an
88
astounding ninety-one percent of the time. That same study found that
potentially compromised justices often refuse to recuse themselves: “In the
215 cases with the most direct potential conflicts of interest, justices
89
recused themselves just 9 times.” These judicial actors are not ensuring
the neutrality of the court; they are ensuring their continued place on the
democratic bench. The tension of judicial elections requires these judges to
stake their legitimacy in ruling according to their voter’s wishes. To some
extent, they are simply doing their jobs.
Judicial elections thereby transform the relationship between the
judiciary and the public, creating a new political market for the delivery of
democratic goods. No longer is the court removed and neutral, but instead
it is a third political branch. As Melinda Gann Hall found in her recent
empirical assessment of judicial campaigns, “Partisan state supreme court
and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When it Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248
(2004)).
85
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elections in many respects resemble their legislative and executive
90
counterparts.” So now, that citizen who is concerned with, say, the death
91
penalty, may look not only to her elected legislators to pass harsher laws,
her elected executive to seek convictions, but now also her elected judges
to impose or uphold the sentence. The Supreme Court’s belief that the
tension of judicial elections can be tamed is fool-hearted: democracy
demands responsiveness, and politician-judges will deliver.
CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen whether a judiciary legitimized by its democratic
appeal rather than its role as a neutral arbiter can persevere. Although
judicial elections have existed for nearly two hundred years, it has only
been fifteen years since the Supreme Court and others have fully opened
these contests to the political machines. This practice places the judiciary
and the whole constitutional system in a perilous position. Writing on the
subject more than two centuries ago, Alexander Hamilton explained:
“There is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers. Liberty can have nothing to fear from the
judiciary alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union with
92
either of the other departments.” Today, a majority of states have merged
the three branches and welcomed in the political parties. And the resulting
tension cannot be easily tamed by creative carve-outs to campaign speech.
Constitutionalism may whither to twenty-first century judicial populism.
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